June 20, 2007
June 15, 2007
Barak Takes Reins as Defense Minister
Incoming Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak.
Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, elected Chairman of the Labor Party last week, will take up his position as Minister of Defense on Monday. The Defense portfolio is guaranteed to Labor under the coalition agreement at the move has widespread support from Kadima’s coalition partners: the Pensioners’ Party and the right-wing Shas and Ysrael Beytanu parties.
Barak is remembered for his participation in the latter part of the Oslo Process, which was derailed with the start of the so-called “Second Intifada” in 2000/2001. He was defeated by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, founder of Kadima, in 2001.
It is unclear what effect Barak’s appointment will have on the government. The Kadima-led coalition of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has come under mounting criticism from the right-wing Likud and National Religious Union parties for its alleged weakness on defense issues. Barak is widely identified with the peace wing of the Labor Party and was dumped by Israeli voters in 2001 in part because of his perceived weakness on defense issues. He edged out the more hawkish Moshe Yaalon for the position of Labor Party Chairman last week.
The appointment was expedited according to YNet News, as a result of mounting security tensions in the West Bank and Gaza.
The Israeli Government: Another Blow?
Have Livni (left), Olmert (right) and Peretz (far-right) managed to look inept yet again?
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and outgoing Defense Minister Amir Peretz have all come under fire for scheduling foreign trips during the Gaza Crisis. Livni and Peretz hurriedly rescheduled their trips and Olmert was forced to defend his meeting Tuesday with President Bush. It was another blow to the Kadima-Labor government that has been criticized for its weak approach to the Palestinian question.
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3413277,00.html
Hamas Controls Gaza
Hamas fighters celebrate in front of the captured Palestinian Security Agency HQ (l). Members of the Fatah-controlled security forces surrender to Hamas gunmen (r).
A new era appeared to dawn in Israel and the Occupied Territories today as the Islamist group Hamas took control over Gaza, seizing institutions of the Palestinian Authority and its main rival, the secularist Fatah organization. Hamas militants seized the headquarters of the P.A.’s intelligence service, Fatah headquarters and the seaside compound of Fatah leader and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), while reports spoke of summary executions of Fatah militants including a commander of the militant Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade. In the West Bank, President Abbas announced the formal dissolution of the “unity government” and the ouster of Prime Minister and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyah and his replacement by former Finance Minister Salam Fayyad as the new Prime Minister. The United States, Israel and the Arab States appeared to be searching for a new way forward following the political earthquake.
The U.S. and Israel immediately moved toward lifting sanctions on the Palestinian Authority Friday. In place for 16 months, the sanctions were directed against any government that included representatives of Hamas, which does not recognize Israel or the peace process and is considered by both the European Union and the U.S. to be a terrorist organization. The Associated Press reported that the EU had reiterated its support for the Abbas-led Palestinian Authority, which retains control over most of the West Bank. Abbas and the Fatah Central Committee said that Hamas’s actions amounted to a coup d’etat against legitimate authority in Gaza and the Palestinian territories.
Hamas Seeks Conciliation, Victory
Spokesmen for Haniyah alternately rejected and scoffed at President Abbas’s move, declaring that Abbas was not being constructive and did not have the power to enforce his announcement at any rate. Yet Haniyah appeared to be attempting to strike a conciliatory note following Hamas’s victory, saying Friday that Hamas remained committed to the unity government envisioned in accords between Fatah and Hamas in Mecca, Saudi Arabia two months ago. Ha’aretz reported that Haniyah spoke of restoring the unity government and making peace with opponents, while Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum was quoted in another article supporting retaining contacts with Israel to ensure continued flow of water and electricity and humanitarian aid into Gaza. Hamas has also pledged to secure the release of BBC correspondent Alan Johnston, kidnapped several months ago. Another Hamas spokesperson, Abu Obeideh, drew a line between Fatah supporters and a “clique” he said was enforcing foreign demands on the Palestinian people in an article in Friday’s Jerusalem Post.
Yet elsewhere there were signs that Hamas was not living up to its conciliatory gestures. CNN and PBS’s The NewsHour reported throughout the morning and last night that several upper-level Fatah and security officials had been summarily executed by Hamas militants after Hamas secured Fatah compounds. Agence France Presse reported that Samih Al Madhoun, a senior commander in the Fatah-linked Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade, was paraded before a jeering crowd and then gunned down in public by Hamas fighters. Hamas militants also looted the home of President Abbas and PA security chief Mahmoud Dalahn. Ha’aretz’s Avi Isaacharaof reported that Hamas appeared to be targeting Fatah’s media infrastructure in Gaza. The Fatah-controlled Voice of Palestine Radio was reportedly torched by Hamas militants, while two pro-Fatah newspapers, Al Hurriya and Al Shabab were shut down. There were indications on Thursday that Hamas was moving to roll up much of the Fatah organization in Gaza, arresting key Fatah leaders who had not escaped to Egypt or the West Bank. Israelfaxx.com reported Friday morning that Hamas had announced that all Fatah militants who had not surrendered would be killed, yet Haniyah and other Hamas leaders appeared to move away from such rhetoric during the morning.
Though Haniyah appeared to want to move forward, rank-and-file Hamas members and lower ranking commanders were in a triumphalist mood. CNN broadcast AP photographs of Hamas militants in Mahmoud Abbas’s office taunting the President and removing photos of Yassir Arafat from the wall and trampling on them. A story on The NewsHour contained a statement by a masked Hamas gunman saying that Hamas’s victory was a victory for Islam over its enemies. There has been speculation, repeated most recently by Michael Moran of the Council on Foreign Relations, of deep divisions within Hamas between moderate a hardline groups and between more secular and more Islamist elements in the organization. A Hamas Gaza leader Niza Ill’an said he planned to hold “Victory Prayers” on Friday at Fatah’s former Gaza headquarters. The New York Times reported this week that leaders of neither Fatah or Hamas had real control over their armed supporters and that the violence was taking on a life of its own.
Meanwhile, there were indications that some violence was spreading to Fatah-controlled West Bank. A senior Hamas official in Nablus was shot dead by the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade and Fatah militants were reportedly rounding up Hamas supporters. Fatah militants seized the Hamas offices in Ramallah and reportedly looted them, throwing furniture out of the windows before setting them alight. Shops owned by Hamas supporters were set on fire in Bethlehem.
The Next Move
Hamas’s victory presented a new problem for policymakers in the United States, the European Union and the Arab world. Ha’aretz reported that Israeli and American officials were eager to bolster Abbas’s position by reopening funding for the Palestinian Authority. Israel has withheld tax revenue from the Palestinian Authority and the so-called “Quartet” (U.S., Russia, the European Union and United Nations) have withheld all but humanitarian assistance since Hamas’s election victory last year. The Israeli government told reporters that it would lift the hold on Palestinian tax revenue immediately. Ha’aretz and the right-wing Arutz Sheva news service were both reporting that U.S. officials are pressuring Israel to make territorial concessions to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank in order to strengthen Fatah’s position. The Israeli government is likely to seek measures to minimize the spread of the conflict – and Hamas success – to the West Bank. The Israeli defense establishment is said to be considering the best options for isolating Gaza. The U.S. military mission in the West Bank, meanwhile, announced that it would continue arming and training members of the Fatah-controlled security forces.
The United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon suggested in response to the situation in Gaza that the UN deploy an emergency force to the area. Yet this suggestion was met with widespread criticism from all sides. Hamas sources said that such a force would be treated as an occupation force, while Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni said Israel would not accept such a force unless it was empowered to disarm Hamas and prevent arms smuggling into Gaza. “We don’t need monitors to come in to tell us about the (smuggling), we need someone to stop it,” she said. U.S. officials said that they would continue to supply weapons and training to Fatah-controlled security forces.
The Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference both called on the Fatah and Hamas leadership to reopen unity discussions and Arab League leaders called on Hamas to submit to the President Abbas’s authority, according to Agence Presse France. The Arab leaders are holding a major summit that had already been scheduled and there is said to be deep concern, especially among Egyptian and Jordanian leaders about what the Hamas victory will mean for the future of the region.
Hamas and Fatah faced their own battles as well. The Jerusalem Post reported that Fatah was faced with an internal rebellion and faced major pressure from Fatah leaders to dismiss Haniyah and bring on a new Prime Minister. Both sides have had a difficult time keeping together an increasingly fractious and factionalized collection of armed groups controlled by disparate organizations and individuals.
Nonetheless, the battlelines forming in the Middle East today appeared to be between two distinct elements. Israel and the United States appear to seek the containment of Hamas’s military success to Gaza and the existence of two Palestines, a Hamas-controlled government in Gaza and a Fatah-controlled West Bank, the latter supported with international money. The Arab League and the OIC seem to be moving the opposite direction. Though neither side would admit to such a policy, Fatah’s moves of late, especially their efforts to bring back Western money, appear to be in the same direction.
The situation at noon today was unstable at best. Though Hamas has clearly vanquished Fatah in Gaza, the next move is anyone’s guess as Hamas appeared unsure as to whether it would attempt to move toward reconciliation or further consolidate its hold over Gaza. Fatah was on a thread as well, as the leadership made tentative moves towards establishing de facto independence in the West Bank and rolling up Hamas in the area but is unwilling or unable to do so publicly. Much depends on the actions of the Quartet and what comes out of the Arab Summit and the Bush-Olmert talks Tuesday. Meanwhile, new Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak is only just getting settled in his position.
June 9, 2007
Unemployment: The Gulf’s Dilemma
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IDF Foils Islamic Jihad Kidnap Attempt
This article appeared on Haaretz today. Palestinian Islamic Jihad, like Hamas, is a radical splinter from the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. PIJ fighters participated in the First Intifada during the 1980s and have contacts with both the Islamic Republic of Iran and Damascus. The group is a sometime ally of several Palestinian groups, including the Syrian-based Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The group carried out this attack with the al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade, a group that initially was considered to be part of the Fatah organization but has more recently taken on a separate existence and is associated with prominent Fatah dissident Marwan Barghouti.
Perhaps the most worrisome development that could emerge – and appears to have been emerging for quite sometime – out of the on-again, off-again clashes between Hamas and Fatah is the potential for the creation of less-ideological organization of militants primarily brought together by their desire to violently fight Israel. An example would be the so-called ‘Resistance Committees’ which emerged in the Second Intifada as a result of Hamas and (especially) Fatah unwillingness to move toward a total war with the Israelis. Such a development would be a nail in the PA’s coffin and mean that Israel would have no negotiating partner that could successfully curtail the lionshare of armed activity in the West Bank and Gaza.
| By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, Haaretz Correspondent and The Associated Press | ||||
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The Israel Defense Forces foiled an attempt by the Islamic Jihad Saturday to kidnap a soldier near the Kissufim Crossing in southern Gaza. “Proper readiness by the forces of the Gaza division and the right actions in the field prevented an attack, apparently a kidnap,” the army’s southern region commander, Major General Yoav Galant said. A spokesman for the Islamic Jihad said that the Palestinian militants who infiltrated into southern Israel tried to take back an IDF soldier into Gaza.(Click here for map) |
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“The aim of the operation was to withdraw with the soldier in captivity,” Abu Ahmed, a spokesman for Islamic Jihad, said. “But the participation of Israeli helicopters prevented that.” According to an IDF inquiry, the four approached the area in a car disguised as a vehicle carrying journalists, blew up the fence and entered Israeli territory. IDF troops chased three of the gunmen back to the Gaza Strip, however, one of them, 19-year-old militant Mohammed Jaabari, became separated from the group and hid inside Israel. He shot dead a dog from the IDF’s canine unit after it revealed his location, and was subsequently killed by IDF fire. An IDF spokesman said there were no reports of missing soldiers or injuries, and denied Palestinian claims that a soldier was captured in the raid. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it had been carried out jointly with the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. This is the first time Palestinian militants have penetrated the Gaza fence since the abduction of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit in June of last year. Security units in nearby Israeli towns and communities were placed on high alert and instructed to lock their entrance gates. Abu Ahmed told local radio stations that four militants had broken through the Gaza border fence. “It is difficult to storm [the area]. But when they entered in a surprise, they confused the enemy,” he said. Abu Ahmed said the militants’ armored jeep collided with an IDF armored vehicle and the Palestinian gunmen used assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades in the ensuing battle. IDF: Troops killed Palestinian militant in south Gaza raid According to the radio, Palestinian sources said IDF troops have been operating in the area since the early morning hours. Palestinian sources said IDF special forces entered the area east of Rafah, followed by tanks and bulldozers under the cover of helicopters. The sources added that soldiers were conducting house to house searches in the area, and that several Palestinians had been arrested. All men under the age of 50 were ordered to gather in specified areas. The IDF confirmed that troops have penetrated some 1.5 kilometers into the southern Gaza Strip, in what the army called an routine effort to target the terrorist infrastructure. The army said troops returned fire against Palestinian militants, killing a gunman. Hamas confirmed its members clashed with IDF tanks and infantry soldiers that entered the Rafah area early Saturday morning. A Palestinian driver struck an IDF soldier south of Hebron early Saturday, lightly wounding him, the radio reported. The driver was able to escape. Also Saturday, IDF troops came under fire in Nablus, but there were no injuries. Security forces arrested two wanted Palestinians in the West Bank on Saturday, including one Hamas member. On Friday, IDF troops shot dead an armed Palestinian and wounded another Friday night near the West Bank city of Hebron, the military said, adding that the wounded man escaped. Residents of the village of Tufah, west of Hebron, said the men were local hunters out looking for game in the dark. They were not known to be Medics said the dead youth was aged 17, while the other man, who was in moderate condition, was 25. An army spokesman said troops spotted a number of men discharging their weapons during target practice and opened fire on them. He said Palestinians carrying weapons were seen as a threat and could be targeted, according to standing orders. “The troops spotted a number of men with guns firing off their weapons and opened fire on them, hitting two of them,” the spokesman said. No IDF soldiers were wounded in the incident. Meanwhile Friday, an IDF soldier was lightly wounded when he was run over by a Palestinian driver in the West Bank, Army Radio reported. The IDF conducted searches in the area in an attempt to locate the assailant. On Wednesday, IDF troops killed two Palestinians in separate incidents, including a 67-year-old man during a raid in the West Bank. In northern Gaza, the Israel Air Force targeted two armed Palestinians “who were spotted planting explosives,” the army said. |
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June 6, 2007
Syria and Israel: The Prospects for Peace
The issue of peace between Israel and Syria has recently gained new life. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert recently convened a special cabinet forum to deal specifically with the Syria issue. The Israeli Defense Forces have conducted major exercises on the Northern Front. At the same time, major Israeli media, have been rife with speculation about where various defense figures have aligned on the issue. There are indications that the time may be right for peace, yet there are major obstacles that mitigate against the chances of a major peace agreement between the Olmert government and Syria.
The Arguments for Peace: Syria
The Syrian government has long expressed an interest in a comprehensive peace settlement with Israel in which Syria will recognize Israel in exchange for the return of the Golan Heights, captured by Israel during the Yom Kippur (1973) War. During negotiations between Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad in the 1990s, Israel agreed in principle to the return of the Golan, but talks broke off as a result of Israeli suspicions and the weakness of the Barak government in the wake of the so-called “Second Intifada” in the Occupied Territories.
Since 2001, the Syrian government has continued to make peace statements, but Israeli and international observers have reason to believe that the Syrians have begun to put new energy into a peace overture. Backdoor negotiations during the Sharon government by Syrian-American businessman Ibrahim Soliman and the new solidity of the Bashar al-Asad regime indicate that Syria may be in the best position since the death of Bashar’s father in 2000 to undertake a major peace overture.
Bashar is not his father, the famed “Sphinx of Damascus” who presided with Machiavellian calculation that made him the longest ruling non-monarchical figure in the Middle East. Bashar’s initial rise to power was marked by deep divisions in the Syrian elite. Many high-ranking military officers and Baath party officials were known to be hostile to Bashar who was chosen as Hafez’s successor only after the death of his elder brother, who was being groomed for the leadership. Bashar may have been attempting to counteract this negative influence by his “Damascus Spring,” a brief effort at political liberalization that began in late-2000. If this was true, Bashar miscalculated. The rising opposition, from intellectuals and reformist Baathists and from both within the Baath-led National Progressive Front and from without quickly exceeded the boundaries of what the regime considered prudent. Still, since the end of the Damascus Spring, Bashar has attempted to cultivate the image of a modern, Western-ish ruler who is nonetheless a devout Muslim (an indication of the growing strength of both moderate and radical Islamist opposition to the regime) and a liberalizer. He has championed economic liberalization and a major effort to reform – or at least talk about reforming – the Baath Party. Despite speculation of a potentially raucous party congress in 2005, the 10th Regional Congress – as a pan-Arab party, the Baath refers to Syria as a ‘region’ of the Arab Nation – was a consolidation of power by Asad. High ranking opponents were ousted from party and state positions while staunch allies have come to fill much of the Baath Party leadership and the state apparatus. This has produced a party and state center that, although sometimes maladroit, is certainly loyal and will likely implement decisions made by Asad and his inner circle, a statement that was open to question as late as 2004, when jihadi militants were streaming across the border into Iraq. Winning the return of the Golan from Israel would solidify Bashar al-Asad’s leadership for years to come and he finally has the power over his state to ensure that his agreement will be implemented.
At the same time, Syria appears to be more anxious about its relationship with Iran, which dates back to the 1980s and is based partially on the two regime’s fears of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and partially on a commonality between Iran’s Shia leadership and the Syrian leadership, which is Allawite. The two countries have collaborated in their support of Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Territories. Yet the removal of Saddam Hussein has done much to change the underlying strategic calculus of the Syria-Iran alliance and the fiery statements of Iranian President Ahmedinajad may echo those of Gamal abd al Nasser, whose leadership led to the Arab defeat in 1967. Like his father, Bashar’s primary concern is likely the survival of the Syrian regime, a goal that he may feel is imperiled by Ahmedinajad’s growing rift with the Gulf States and Saudi Arabi, Egypt and Jordan. Syrian officials, according to MEMRI’s H. Valrukar, have been attempting to walk back divisive comments made about Arab leaders who did not give Hizballah full-throated support during the 2006 war and the London-based Al-Hayat newspaper quoted Lebanese sources that indicated the Syrians pressured Hamas to attend the Mecca Conference between Hamas and Fatah in order to curry favor with the Saudis. Recently Syria’s Vice-President Farouk al-Shara has embarked on a regional tour, likely an effort to reach out to previously alienated states and broaden the regime’s contacts in the region. In interviews with Crisis Group, Syrian officials went to great length to stress the “strategic” nature of their relationship with Iran and indicated that it would change should Syria win an end to isolation and the return of the Golan.
In addition, Syrian isolation after 9/11 and as a result of its unapologetic support of Hizballah appears to be hurting the regime. Bashar, who lived much of his life in London, may be more personally hurt than his father by Western opprobrium, but more concrete concerns are looming. Syria’s economy is suffering, and the global rise in oil prices has only put off what many see as an inevitable economic collapse. Oil production has fallen consistently since 1996 and an analysis by the International Monetary Fund concluded that Syria will likely become a net oil importer by 2010 and, without substantial reform, Syrian public debt will eat up more than 100 percent of GDP by 2015. Syria’s desperation for FDI was illustrated by Bashar’s willingness to accept far-reaching economic liberalization in exchange for economic cooperation with the European Union. The agreement was canceled in the wake of the Hariri assassination. Such liberalization would require a substantial reduction in the public sector, yet public sector employment – and the bribes and corruption that go along with it – are a major component of the regime’s vast patronage system. Hafiz would likely never have accepted such liberalization. As the logic goes, in order to enforce the necessary economic liberalization measures, Bashar would require a political coup de gras such as winning the return of the Golan from Israel. A peace with Israel would also free the Asad regime to reduce military spending and would likely result in better relations with the European Union and the United States, with accompanying reductions in the restrictions on trade and commerce placed on it by both as a result of its position vis-à-vis Israel and because of the Hariri assassination.
According to a recent analysis by the respected International Crisis Group, Syrian officials believe that they have a good chance at gaining the return of the Golan Heights. The Bashar regime genuinely believes that, in the wake of Iraq and Iran and Israel’s embarrassment in the Hezbollah War, the U.S. and Israel are both on the defensive. They seem to feel that this would be a good moment to offer the prospect of Syrian recognition and a peace treaty.
The Arguments for Peace: Israel
One of the strongest arguments that Israel will move forward with some kind of negotiations with the Syrians is that, since its founding in 1948, Israeli regional policy has been based on the underlying concept of a durable, secure peace and normalized relations with its Arab neighbors. Generally, the Israeli policy has been that if an Arab state makes a peace overture to Israel, Israeli leaders should follow up.
Israel benefits from peace with its Arab neighbors, including Syria, economically. Peace with Egypt opened up Egyptian markets and finance to Israeli business and the fewer enemies in the region, the smaller Israel’s military expenditure. The Israeli economy is weak and substantially dependent on international assistance and preferential trading deals with the United States and the European Union.
Diplomatic relations between Syria and Israel would give the Israelis the opportunity to defuse regional crises. Israeli relations with Egypt have given the Israelis back-channel avenues of communication with both Hamas and the PLO and the opportunity to use Egypt to defuse tensions with its neighbors. Opening a similar channel with Syria will reduce tensions in the region and allow the Israelis access to Hizballah and Hamas. A better relationship between Syria and Israel would mean a change in Syria’s relationship to both Hizballah and Hamas and a host of smaller, but deadly Palestinian factions like Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the PFLP-General Command, all of which have relations with the Syrians. This would seem especially important to the Olmert government given the government’s stated inability to find an appropriate defense against Qassam attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian factions from the Occupied Territories into Sderot. Finally, a wedge between Syria and Iran and the further diplomatic and regional isolation of the Iranian regime is in both Israel’s and America’s interests.
Strategically, many have argued that the Golan Heights is less strategically relevant than it has been in the past. The historian Martin van Crevald has argued that the small number of access points for Syrian armor and troops makes them easy targets on the downward slope. Also, during negotiations in the 1990s, the Hafiz al-Asad accepted the placement of an international monitoring force, including Americans, and a 30 km demilitarized area around the Golan to ensure Israel’s security. The area has not seen a significant military buildup since the 1970s and according to the UN’s Golan monitoring group, both sides remain well below the 2000 troop limit in the area.
There are concerns on both sides that if the situation on the Golan remains frozen, conflict will result. The International Crisis Group speculated that Syria may take actions in order to unfreeze the situation, much as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat is believed by many to have initiated the 1973 War in order to build up his credibility in Egypt and to change the dynamic of the Eygptian-Israeli relationship in order to move forward with a comprehensive peace plan. Tensions between Syria and Israel have mounted in recent weeks, both as a result of the Hamas Qassam attacks and because of Syrian frustrations over Israeli unwillingness to move ahead with a Golan process. Muhammad Habash, a Syrian Member of Parliament told Al-Jazeera that Israel was seeking a war this summer and Israel has been sending mixed signals, Prime Minister Olmert has repeatedly stated that he seeks peace with Syria, yet the Israeli Defense Forces recently mounted a major exercise simulating an apparent pre-emptive attack or counter-attack against Syria.
Israel’s position in the region is weaker than at any time since the withdrawal from South Lebanon in 1989. The Israeli military was embarrassed by its performance in the Hizballah War and far-reaching and disruptive overhauls will likely result from the Weinograd Commission report released two weeks ago. The overhaul may leave the IDF at below desired standards of morale and organization for some time to come, at the same time a new report indicates that the IDF is divided about the future, with the Air Force apparently focusing on Hamas and the Palestinian territories while the Army believes that the major theater is the Northern Front. Prime Minister Olmert’s position is tenuous at best, he apparently comes in a distant third in Prime Ministerial polls behind hardliners Benjamin Netanyahu of the re-energized Likud Party and Avigdor Lieberman of the far-right Yisrael Beytenu party. He is only slightly more popular than Labor leader and Amir Peretz, Kadima’s major coalition partner who has been taken to task for incompetence as Minister of Defense. The rehashing of the Hizballah War last summer has cast Olmert as uninformed, disorganized and disoriented. More popular Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni recently said that she would not challenge Olmert for the leadership of Kadima…for now…but the very fact that the question was asked indicates that Olmert is in deep trouble. Corruption scandals have dogged his administration and the Israeli President has been removed pending investigation of a sexual harassment scandal. Olmert can re-establish his leadership by boldly entering into a peace process with Syria. Exploring the possibilities of a peace process with the Syrians may be Israel’s best bet at least while the armed forces reorganizes and regroups from the Hizballah debacle.
The Israelis appear to be taking Syria’s peace overtures seriously. Although returning the Golan is not particularly popular, neither was returning the Sinai to Egypt at first. Olmert has established a cabinet forum on Syria involving high-level members of the government representing all the member parties and has obviously consulted the IDF and the Mossad on the issue. The intelligence agency is currently against negotiations, although it is clearly internally divided, while the IDF appears to support the a peace effort, again with reservations.
Arguments against Peace
There are, however, substantial arguments against the possibility of a peace process. Both Washington and Syria’s regional “allies” are more inclined, at least for the moment, to keep the Syrians isolated. Syria remains a major conduit for Western – especially Russian – high-tech weapons systems to enter into Iran around UN sanctions and the Syrians’ support for Shiite Hizballah continues to roil Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt, as does Syria’s undermining of various Arab peace plans by supporting Hamas. Egypt likely sees the Syrians as a direct competitor for influence in the West Bank and Gaza, as the former supports the ‘moderate’ Fatah leadership under Mahmoud Abbas. Washington continues to maintain Syria in isolation and, according to State Department officials, ‘does not encourage’ an Israeli-Syrian peace process at this time. Washington’s objections may quickly be wearing away as Condaleeza Rice and the State Department have found it necessary to include Syria on several regional conference on Iraq, but for the moment, America’s opposition appears to have been a major reason for Israeli foot-dragging in answering Syria’s overtures. At the same time, Israel sees its interests and Saudi Arabia’s coinciding against Iranian power in the region. The Israelis are inclined to pursue a balance against Iran, which they view as a larger threat, and the prospect of improved relations with the Saudi kingdom, which influences millions of Sunnis around the world, is likely a tantalizing one indeed.
As to the strategic importance of the Golan Heights, arguments against it are weak at best. Despite advances in de-salinization, the Golan snowmelt remains an important source of water, 40 percent of Israeli agriculture and an important radar and overwatch site that gives the Israeli military an unobstructed view of Syrian airspace. You will excuse us for not being too excited about an international force, an Israeli might say, given the experience of UNEF in 1967 and of UNIFIL 1 during operations against Hizballah. Van Crevald’s objections about armor and infantry may be true, but the Hizballah War has shown the damage that can be inflicted – economic, human and political – of Qassam and Katyusha rocket attacks. The Syrians have spent a great deal of money on an extensive upgrade of ground-to-ground missile capacity and rooting out Syrian, Hamas or Hizballah rocket teams ensconced in the Golan Heights, which command much of Israel, would be a bloody affair indeed. Aluf Benn of Haaretz quoted an unnamed Israeli official asking We wish to know whether the border overlooking [Lake] Kinneret [the lake at the base of the Golan] will be quiet, or whether there will be Hamas outposts and Iranian forces.” The Israeli Defense Forces place a strong emphasis on early warning and deterrence in order to keep a small standing army, many argue that giving up the Golan would reduce both of these central doctrinal elements.
As to Olmert’s position, returning the Golan Heights would be more complicated and politically volatile than Sharon’s disengagement plan. Over seventy percent of Israelis oppose returning the Golan and yes, a huge majority opposed returning the Sinai to Egypt, but Ehud Olmert is not Menachem Began. Began was a confirmed hawk, a veteran of the founding of Israel and leader of the loyal opposition during both the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, he was an acolyte of Jabotinsky’s Revisionist Zionism and a founding member of Herut, the forerunner of the modern Likud party. It was possible to disagree with Began, but it was not possible to think of him as incompetent. Olmert, by contrast, is considered by many to be Israel’s worst Prime Minister, a Prime Minister by default who has badly mismanaged both the Occupied Territories and the Hizballah War. Ariel Cohen of the conservative Heritage Foundation has called the current situation “the worst government crisis in Israel’s 59-year history.” Olmert has been buffeted from all sides by all imaginable forms of political disaster: mismanagement of defense, corruption and influence peddling, sexual harassment. He, his Defense Minister, his Finance Minister and the President (among the major supporters of peace with Syria) are simultaneously under investigation and the very future of Kadima as a viable political entity are in question. Unlike the West Bank and Gaza, which most Israelis were ready to let go of, the Golan is not seen as a strategic problem, it is almost totally populated by Israelis. The Israelis in the Golan are by-and-large Labor Zionists, while the West Bank settler communities were identified predominantly with radical religious Zionists. Former IDF soldiers who served in the territories have regaled me with horror stories of the settlers, who are seen by the Israeli population as troublesome and outside the mainstream.
Israeli politics appear to be shifting substantially to the right. It would have been unthinkable in 2000 that Benjamin Netanyahu would suddenly be rehabilitated politically, yet he has been, and Avigdor Lieberman may run a close second, meaning that two candidates of the far-right would outpoll the current Prime Minister if the election were held today. Even Labor is moving to the hardline, it appears that security hardliner Moshe Ya’alon, who has called for a return of troops into the West Bank and Gaza and has rejected Mahmoud Abbas as a partner, will win the race for the Labor chairmanship. While it is tempting to look at the formation of a Syria Forum in the Israeli cabinet as a step toward dialogue with the Syrians, it should be pointed out that the Forum consists of one discredited coalition partner (Peretz) and two potential leadership challengers (Livni and Lieberman). The future of Labor’s membership in the governing coalition is in question and Olmert may see an opportunity in letting two or three potential challengers get bogged down in the Syria question.
The Pelosi trip to Damascus this spring may have thrown another wrench into the mix, leaving Israel unsure as to where the United States will stand in the future. Pelosi’s statement that Israel was eager for peace had to be walked back by the Olmert government. This insecurity, combined with insecurity regarding the Israeli military, will likely put Israel off negotiating. Israel does not want to appear as if it will do anything to prevent Qassam rockets from hitting Sderot, even sell out its longterm interests. The IDF has been pointedly aware of Syrian efforts to overhaul their armed forces and their investment in long-range rockets.
Israeli officials continue to worry about the weakness of the Bashar regime. Why bother signing an accord with a dictator not long for this world? Although al-Asad has solidified his support within the Baath Party, his rather clumsy efforts to reinvent himself as a pious Sunni and co-opt Islamism have yet to convince skeptical Israeli officials, who worry that a deal over the Golan may spark an uprising by Sunni radicals and the ouster of the regime, or at least the state’s collapse.
On the Syrian side, there are solid arguments that the Syrians are interested in the process, but not in the ultimate end. Barry Rubin has argued that the Syrians derive their power from their power to make mischief in the region, echoing Fuad Ajami. Unlike some, who argue that Syria is ultimately a Machiavellian state, Rubin argues that Syria needs the twin ideologies of Arab Nationalism and Islamism to justified its continued existence, war with Israel to justify its ongoing state of emergency. Without conflict with Israel, the regime ceases to exist.
Finally, the Syrians have recently begun to walk away from prior commitments to liberalization as per the formula worked out with the European Union. Dr. Muhammad al-Husseini told the Syrian Arab News Agency that Syria’s massive public sector was a “red line” and a key component of the Baath’s new “social market economy.” The Syrians may be moving away from a liberalization/openness approach, which would undercut the argument that a Golan peace would be necessary to sell the public on a liberalization program.
Finally, the Israelis are acutely concerned about the impact a Golan peace initiative would have on the anti-Syrian opposition in Lebanon. Israel and the United States have so far preferred to support Lebanese nationalist politicians and push for the creation of a Lebanese state friendly to Israel and independent of Syria on Syria’s flank. Such a development would allow the Israelis to reduce the threat from Syria while simultaneously maintaining control of the Golan Heights.
That is how the cards stack up from here. Finally, of course, there are personalities. Is Bashar truly a proponent of peace, sharing his father’s sentimental attachment to Lake Kinneret? Is Olmert strong enough to lead Israel against its will into a peace settlement? Is a peace settlement a strategic necessity for the Israelis or merely a desirable goal, the former enjoining a much more aggressive pursuit of negotiation? The next few months will tell a great deal. If Ayalon defeats Ehud Barak in the Labor convention, it could result in a major turnover in government and perhaps win breathing room for the government under a new leader. Should Qassam attacks worsen, however, it won’t matter who is in power, an attack into the West Bank and/or Gaza will make negotiating with Syria almost impossible.
May 31, 2007
First Reaction: Fred Thompson on the Middle East
Fred Thompson’s exploratory committee and likely Presidential run has spurred a great deal of discussion, indeed excitement, among media pundits and the Republican grassroots. Conservative Republicans have been up in arms since the campaign began. They question the conservative credentials of Mitt Romney and lament the colorlessness of much of the conservative crowd, Kansas Sen. Brownback and former Virginia Gov. Jim Gilmore did not really separate themselves from the pack. While Arkansas Gov. Mike Huckabee is generally conservative, he does not espouse the muscular, confident conservatism of a Ronald Reagan or a first-term George W. Bush. Thompson gives many conservative voters a shot in the arm because of his immediate name and face recognition, his supposed “actor’s ability” to appeal to people and his folksy, populist touch. In the first of what I hope will be many analyses of frontrunners’ Mideast positions, I scoured the internet for Thompson’s public statements about Iraq and the wider Middle East.
The first thing that jumped out at me – and something that no doubt is on the minds of conservative Republican strategists – is that Thompson would rather talk about other things. Many Republican insiders have been saying that the party’s best strategy is going to be to change the discussion from the Administration’s Iraq problems to areas where they are more likely to have an edge on Democrats: taxes, spending and values. To that end, Thompson’s main thrusts have been a kind of folksy populist traditional values position, that sounds less like Jerry Fallwell and more like a conservative version of The News from Lake Woebegon and a call for small government and low taxes. However, Thompson has made enough public statements and penned enough articles to allow something to take shape.
Sen. Thompson tends to steer clear of the more difficult issues, preferring to linger on ’safe’ topics. He assailed the Iranian government’s bizarre assertion that the action film The 300 was psychological warfare against the Iranian people, lamented the treatment of women in the Middle East and attacked a trend – much reported in conservative media – of British schools abandoning teaching of The Holocaust and Crusades because some Muslims children’s parents objected. Few people would argue against the Senator’s contention that the Holocaust is an historical fact, The 300 was probably not written by the CIA and radical Islam is not nice for women.
Thompson’s biggest concern, that which he spends the most time writing about, is Iran. He tends to talk more about Iran than Iraq. Again from a political standpoint this might not be the worst idea, a muscular approach to Iran appears to go down well with voters. Thompson has referred to Hizballah as Iran’s puppets, denounced the West’s response to the kidnapping of British sailors by the Iranian navy this winter and has called for more muscular action against the Iranian nuclear program. He seems to think of Iran as the largest threat to Middle East security over the long-term, an argument that is not without its supporters and believes that as many as four Middle East states are in a position to ‘go nuclear’ should the Iranians complete their nuclear project. He has fallen short, however, of calling for military action, preferring at this point the “Iran will fall by its own weight” approach and backing a Radio Free Europe-type broadcast program into Iran combined with support for Iranian civil society.
On Iraq, Thompson has been a less-than-vocal supporter of the Administration’s “Surge” strategy and sometimes sounds like New York Times and NewsHour analyst David Brooks in his rather disappointed and sad feeling on the war. In mid-March he told Wall Street Journal writer John Fund that the U.S. is “left with nothing but bad choices” but that the “worst choice” would be to withdraw from Iraq, which would “prove Osama Bin Laden right” that Americans were unable to stomach difficult struggles. He also sees Iraqi through the prism of Iran, arguing that withdrawal from Iraq would reduce American leverage on the Islamic Republic according to New York Times blogger Sarah Wheaton. This is not without its supporters either. He also argues, without a citation, that the U.S. invasion of Iraq has improved the condition of Iraqi women and decreased infant mortality rates. There is evidence to this effect about Afghanistan, which he also cites. I have not seen similar evidence for Iraq, though that does not mean it does not exist.
It is a bit early to flesh out the Senator’s positions on the Middle East. Much of what I culled from a Google search or two is pablem for the talk radio/editorial crowd: simplistic and sentimental, not without a grain of truth but made for public consumption, the Left produces the same kind of stuff. Still, there are some things to be concerned about and some things to be less concerned about.
For all of Thompson’s bluster, it seems he would not support some kind of massive military assault on Iran, unlike some conservative pundits like Normal Podhoretz or the Weekly Standard, who have come out for a warlike response. Thompson seems more inspired by the Ronald Reagan-USSR example.
That said, Thompson’s call to support Civil Society in Iran monetarily and to perform RFE-style broadcasts into the country is not without its critics. The Iranian democracy movement is divided over the effectiveness of U.S. aid, with most Iranians arguing that it hurts more than it helps by identifying pro-democracy organizations with the United States and, by extension, “regime change.”
Second, Thompson is pro-Israel and supports Israeli military action in the West Bank and Gaza. He saw fit to chalk up most Middle Eastern hostility toward Israel and the West to the fact that the Holocaust is not taught in schools. While this is problematic, any effort to promote peace in the wider Middle East needs to recognize the complex causes of Israel-Palestine. He is supportive of Israeli military responses to Hamas and Hizballah, not exactly a controversial position. He argues, too, that Iranian nuclear developments will alter the balance of power and prevent Israel from protecting itself while simultaneoulsy challenging Israel’s existence.
Thompson does use the term “Islamo-fascism,” which is something of a Right shibboleth. Some argue that the term adequate captures the ‘enemy we are fighting’ – not Muslims but totalitarians who use Islam to legitimize their aspirations. Others argue that, like “homicide-bombing” it is a term that is designed to inflame and, sociologically, to separate those who are “in” from those who are “out” (e.g., “First of all I don’t want to talk to somebody who doesn’t recognize that it’s not a ’suicide-bombing’ it’s a ‘homicide-bombing.’”)
Unlike President Bush, Thompson remains strongly critical of the Saudi government. Most administrations – Democrat and Republican – have relied on the Saudis as a pillar of Middle Eastern policy. Thompson, however, criticizes their Islamist government and their attitude toward women.
Most of this is fairly standard stuff for the talk-radio crowd. What I found interesting, however, was the Senator’s grouping of Iraq in with, for example, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as areas where awful practices like ‘honor killing’ (I believe that is actually a pre-Islamic custom but I could be wrong on that) and the Taliban. In a recent posting on the conservative blog Townhall.com, he writes of “horrors of life for millions of women in pre-liberation Iraq” such as “endemic beatings, honor killings and forced marriages of women.” Yet while tribal practices like honor killing and the repression of women through rigorous adherence to Sharia certainly took place in Iraq, its explosion has been a post-Saddam phenomenon. The leftist Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom’s PeaceWomen posted a 2005 report from the Institute for War and Peace Reporting to this effect. This is a common argument from people with little knowledge about the Middle East who believe that all Middle Eastern or Islamic countries share common interpretations of religion and religious law and oppress women through ‘orthodox’ Islamist practice.
It is fair to say, I think, that Senator Thompson needs to take a crash-course in Middle Eastern politics and history and flesh out the details on issues like Iran, Israel-Palestine and Iraq. His positions today appear to be a collection of emotional impulses, not a coherent strategy for the region.
Iran: Budging or Not on Its Nuclear Program?
Iran’s FM Ali Larjani announced today that Iran was ready to address Western concerns about weapons proliferation, provided those concerns were “not a pretext” according to Iran Daily and again rejected the suspension of uranium enrichment as a precondition for entering into talks with the West. He appears to have seized on the statements of IAEA Director Mohammad al-Baradei – statements that got the the U.S. pretty steamed – to try to throw a monkey wrench into the increasingly united, and frustrated, EU3 plus USA. The Iranians are probably testing the waters to see how Nicholas Sarkozy will respond, and how the rest of the EU will respond to him. Is it an opening? Or is it another attempt to drive a wedge between the Europeans and the US? Only time will tell, I guess.
The Iran Daily article is linked here: http://www.iran-daily.com/1386/2857/html/
And an interesting article from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy here: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2608
May 30, 2007
Israeli Officials Believe Syria is Serious About Negotiations
This was posted on the Bilad Ash-sham blog (http://biladsham.blogspot.com) from Reuters. A successful conclusion to the Golan Heights issue would certainly be a feather in Bashar al-Asad’s cap and a bit way for Bashar to consolidate his hold on power and to bring Syria into the international community. However, some pretty major questions remain: can Bashar bring the Syrian security establishment along? Will peace with Israel create the political space that Sunni fundamentalists in Syria have been looking for? Will Bashar be more prepared compromise that his father? It does appear to be a bit of a ‘perfect storm.’ After the problems with Hizballah and questions about the Israeli government’s ability to deal with insurgency and the Muslim world, and the threat of Iran, the Israeli government is looking for a way to improve its position domestically and get some of the pressure off.
Israeli Officials Believe Syria is Serious about Resuming Peace Talks
(Reuters) There is a growing consensus within the Israeli government that Syria is serious about resuming negotiations with the Jewish state, Israeli officials involved in the assessment said on Saturday.
The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, and a former Israeli diplomat who drafted an unofficial peace plan, said U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s recent meeting with the Syrian foreign minister may have opened the door for reviving the long-dormant Israeli-Syrian track.
But it was unclear whether Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert would respond positively to the public and private overtures from Syrian President Bashar Assad, the Israeli officials and the former diplomat, Alon Liel, told Reuters. Western diplomats say Olmert appeared to be receptive to the idea of Syrian talks, although officials in his office said the prime minister remained skeptical of Assad’s intentions.
“We lose sleep at night worrying that this may be a trap,” a senior Israeli official involved in the review said. With Israeli-Palestinian talks frozen and an offensive underway in Gaza, Olmert could benefit from any positive diplomatic movement on the northern border after a scathing report on his handling of last year’s war in Lebanon.
“There are too many signals that Assad wants to talk and many signals that he is interested in finalizing an agreement,” Liel said. “It’s irresponsible for a prime minister not to check these signals. If he checks and finds that Syria is not ready, he can come to the public and explain it. But if he does not check and we have a war, he will be personally responsible for the war.”
Hard Choices
Liel and a Syrian-American businessman worked on a blueprint for peace in talks from 2004-2006. War erupted between Israel and the Syrian-backed Lebanese group Hizbullah last July. Since then, Assad has voiced interest in resuming talks with Israel that stalled in 2000 over Damascus’s demand for a return of the occupied Golan Heights.
Syria has also hinted that it could resort to military force if it deems diplomacy a dead end. Olmert’s office declined to comment but an Israeli government official said earlier this week that the prime minister still sees the Syrian government “as not yet ready for the hard choices needed to make peace”.
Olmert has demanded that Syria cease supporting Hizbullah and Palestinian militant groups as a condition of resuming talks, and dismissed Syrian overtures as a bid to improve ties with the West. But in recent months, in coordination with Olmert’s office, Israel’s Foreign Ministry and intelligence agencies have conducted a review of Assad’s public and private messages. “We have reached the conclusion that they (the overtures) are serious. We think that he (Assad) is serious”, said a senior official involved in the inter-agency review.
The official said there was still considerable concern on the Israeli side that Damascus would try to use negotiations to divert attention away from Syria’s military build-up. “We don’t have any concrete evidence that this is not a trap to paralyze Israel’s ability to counter Syria’s military build-up. But we don’t have any concrete evidence that it is a trap.” Israeli officials said the conclusions of the inter-agency review have been discussed at the highest levels of government, but Olmert has yet to make clear where he stands. “So if there is a change, it is in Olmert’s mind himself and this is very important. He is the key person here,” Liel said.
